Using Simulation to Determine Optimal Employee Participation in Employee Stock Purchase Plans by Janofsky, Alexander
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton School
April 2005
Using Simulation to Determine Optimal Employee
Participation in Employee Stock Purchase Plans
Alexander Janofsky
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/26
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Janofsky, Alexander, "Using Simulation to Determine Optimal Employee Participation in Employee Stock Purchase Plans" (2005).
Wharton Research Scholars. 26.
http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/26
Using Simulation to Determine Optimal Employee Participation in
Employee Stock Purchase Plans
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/26
 
 
Using simulation to determine optimal 
employee participation in Employee Stock 
Purchase Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Alexander Janofsky 
Wharton Research Scholar 
 
 
Advisor 
 
Professor Brigitte Madrian  
Department of Business and Public Policy 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
April 2005 
Introduction 
An Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) is a specific type of company stock 
ownership plan sponsored by an employee’s company and defined by appropriate federal 
regulators. The ESPP is designed to encourage saving and investment among mostly non-
executive workers while leveraging the perceived incentive benefits provided by 
company stock ownership.  
ESPPs are a particularly compelling retirement vehicle to study because the recent 
corporate scandals and subsequent loss of retirement assets have put renewed focus on 
the allocation of retirement assets to company stock. Many have been calling for 
government to limit retirement plans which encourage or require investments in company 
stock. For instance, federal legislators have recently proposed a law allowing investors in 
401K plans with assets in company stock to trade out of that stock after three years. 
This investigation seeks to explore the risk-return tradeoffs faced by ESPP 
participants and, in doing so, determine optimal investment behavior.I seek to understand 
to extent to which the specific benefits of ESPP participation justify concentration of 
retirement assets into a single stock. Rather than analyze this vehicle from a pure 
economic perspective to understand how it allocates costs between employees and 
employers, I focus solely on the employee’s investment decisions. 
This paper first describes the features, mechanics, and tax treatment of ESPPs. 
Secondly, after motivating my investigation, I describe the methodology of the 
simulation I executed to mimic the returns on ESPPs and other assets of interest. Thirdly, 
I analyze the results from the simulation, including specific comparisons aimed at 
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determining optimal investment behavior. Finally, I conclude with a suggestion for 
optimal employee investment behavior in ESPPs. 
 
Description of Employee Stock Purchase Plans 
Participation in an ESPP is voluntary and involves after-tax income. Contributed 
funds are used to purchase company stock at market price or a discount (usually the 
maximum 15% permitted by regulations). This discount provides ESPPs an instant 
guaranteed initial return. Thus, failure to participate altogether would be akin to refusing 
cash. Most plans limit employee contributions to between 10 and 15 percent of 
compensation. 
Generally, ESPPs are open to employee contributions over a specified offering 
period. The lengths of these periods vary, but many companies choose 6 months. Cash 
contributions are accrued throughout the offering period directly from salary. 
Most of these plans have “look-back” features which specify that the price at 
which the stock is purchased is the minimum of the fair market value at the beginning 
and end of the offering period. Some ESPPs also offer employees the option of removing 
contributed funds from the plan before the end of the offering period. 
The look-back feature is an imbedded, at-the-money European call option 
position with maturity equal to the length of the offering period. Intuitively this follows 
since the look-back feature only has value if the stock price increases during the offering 
period. The number of shares on which this option is written is equal to the initial 
investment (after the discount) divided by the price of the stock at the beginning of the 
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offering period. Below I derive this result. T is initial investment, d is the discount 
percentage, Si is initial stock price, and Sf is stock price at the end of the offering period. 
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Clearly this payoff represents a European call option on the number of shares that could 
be bought with the discount at the beginning of the offering period, with strike equal to 
the initial stock price.  
For tax treatment, ESPPs are classified as either qualified or nonqualified. 
Qualified plans comply with specific tax rulesi. Among these rules is an annual 
contribution limit of $25,000 for each employee and the 1-2 holding ruleii which ensures 
that participants have held onto the stock for a sufficiently long period of time.  
All gains on ESPP investments that are sold immediately after the purchase occurs at the 
end of the offering period are taxed as income. Qualified plans are taxed so that gains 
from the discount are taxed as income, but returns in excess of the discount are taxed as 
capital gains. For instance, if the sale position is less than the original position after the 
discount but still includes a gain, the entire gain is taxed as ordinary income. Since the 
capital gains rate is usually below the marginal income tax rate for ESPP investors, a 
qualified position provides a tax advantage. Nonqualified plans are taxed similarly to 
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qualified plans except the discount and benefits from the look-back are both taxed as 
ordinary income regardless of if, at disposal, an overall gain or loss on the ESPP is 
realized. 
If one considers that the discount is just ordinary compensation, the tax benefit 
from an ESPP investment over an independent investment in company stock outside of 
the ESPP framework ultimately comes from the fact that benefits associated with the 
look-back option are taxed at the capital gains rate. 
ESPPs differ from more ubiquitous 401(K) plans in several ways. While ESPP 
contributions come from after-tax income, 401(K) contributions are pre-tax. Furthermore, 
ESPPs allocate all contributions to company stock while 401(K) plans may include some 
company stock as one of numerous investment options. The ESPP look-back and 
discount features are also not part of a standard 401(K) plan. However, 401(K) plans 
often contain employer matching provisions which are not common in ESPPs. The two 
vehicles also substantially differ in tax treatment. 
 
Question of Interest 
 The primary disadvantage of ESPP participation is it concentrates a large amount 
of personal investment capital in a single risky security, undermining portfolio 
diversification. The benefits of diversification are well-established. They stem from the 
fact that a portfolio consisting of several uncorrelated return streams has a lower variance 
in total return than a portfolio with the same expected return but consisting of only one or 
two return streams. Since many investors are sufficiently diversified, the market prices 
equity to reflect the marginal risk-reward tolerance of these diversified investors. Thus, 
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underdiversification undermines the relative value of a portfolio by exposing the investor 
to the risk of an undiversified investment but yielding the lower return demanded by 
diversified investors. So, concentrating personal investment capital in a single stock 
undermines the value of that investment in terms of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
 My intent in executing the simulation described below is to generate distributions 
of returns from ESPP investment and as well as from some standard alternatives. By 
comparing the generated return distributions, I will be able to describe the specific nature 
of the risk-reward tradeoff of ESPPs as compared to alternative strategies and 
benchmarks. I hope to understand how this tradeoff evolves over various time horizons. 
Since participation in ESPPs clearly is advantageous in absolute terms, I am most 
interested in discerning optimal participation length. For instance, is same-day sale the 
optimal strategy or should participants maintain their ESPP position for longer periods. 
Another less-obvious economic disadvantage to investing in one’s own company 
is the correlation between labor income and the company stock price. I do not address 
this because the simulation focuses on returns to ESPP investment while excluding a 
more robust life-cycle approach. Analysis of the labor income correlation effect would 
require imbedding the simulated ESPP investment in a life-cycle model to track labor 
income, investment income, and total wealth over a long period of time. 
 
Methodology 
 To determine the employee’s optimal participation behavior with regard to 
Employee Stock Purchase Plans, I simulate returns to participation over varying 
investment period lengths for the entire stock market. This simulation specifically 
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addresses the following question: assuming a randomly selected firm implemented an 
ESPP, what characteristics would define the resulting return distribution for participating 
employees, and how would this distribution compare to distributions of benchmark 
returns?  
 I choose to examine all firms instead of limiting my analysis to those with a 
record of offering ESPPs for two reasons. Practically, I would have found it difficult 
obtaining a list of companies that offer actual ESPPs and then obtain the specific 
parameters and offer dates of those plans. Furthermore, I believe that characterizing the 
risks and rewards from the perspective of employees for a company interested in 
implementing an ESPP will yield more fruitful conclusions.  
The one drawback to simulating over all firms as opposed to just those which 
actually offer ESPPs, is such a method ignores potential biases in the type of firms which 
choose to offer ESPPs. For instance, perhaps firms with a certain type of return 
distribution are more likely to offer ESPPs. Since I am focusing on the larger question of 
how an employee in any given firm would respond to an ESPP offer, this bias should not 
affect my conclusions. 
Raw Data 
 The only raw data necessary for these simulations is a list of all publicly traded 
companies, their stocks’ monthly holding period returns, and the simultaneous returns on 
the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index and on a riskless investment. I choose to examine 
holding period returns because price is affected by splits, does not account for mergers, 
and ignores dividends. Monthly data is most appropriate because the parameters of 
ESPPs dictate a minimum investment period of six months. This means yearly data 
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would not provide enough detail while daily data would incur great computational 
expense without a substantial increase in the simulation’s validity or accuracy. 
 The list of all publicly traded companies is easily obtained from the joint 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP database. Using the joint database is important because, while 
CRSP provides all of the necessary stock return information, it its indexes records by 
security instead of by company. Unfortunately, the joint database only extends back to 
1962 instead of 1925, as the CRSP database proper does. As a result, my analysis of “all 
companies” is limited to companies which have been publicly traded at any time from 
1962 to 2004 and which have been assigned a PERMNO identifier. The resulting list 
contains 8,487 companies. Since I only use the joint database to retrieve company 
identifiers, if a company also has return data prior to 1962, I include that in the 
simulation. For example, IBM is included in my list of companies since it has been traded 
since 1962, but my IBM monthly return series extends back to 1925.  
 While, ideally, this analysis would have included every single publicly traded 
company over the past 85 years, the sample universe is still extremely large and I have no 
reason to believe that any of the aforementioned exclusions bias results. Specifically, no 
evidence exists of a relationship between returns and whether or not a company has been 
assigned a PERMNO. Additionally, forty years will likely be long enough to account for 
business cycle bias and survivor bias. Business cycle bias comes from looking at returns 
from a shorter period of time and thus characterized by a particular macroeconomic 
environment. For instance, limiting the simulation to 1995-1999 would probably 
characterize an ESPP investment as more rewarding than it perhaps would be in a more 
neutral macroeconomic environment because equity returns during the late 90’s were at 
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an historical peak. Additionally, limiting the simulation to a shorter, more recent series of 
returns would implicitly bias the results toward “survivor” companies. Companies which 
had failed before the data series began would be not be included, while companies which 
had succeeded would be included. A longer data period helps control for both business 
cycle and survivor bias. 
 I realize that there is a tradeoff between using older data to control for business 
cycle bias and survivor bias in that the equity markets have probably undergone 
significant structural changes over the past 40 years. If the relationship between 
individual equity, market, and fixed income returns has changed over the last 40 years, 
the predictive value of my analysis would be undermined since I would be using 
properties that have since changed to describe the current and future world. An example 
would be the theoretical premium on equity returns over the risk free rate. Since the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that this premium has decreased during the past 40 
years, the spread between equity returns and a riskless return might be significantly 
higher in the simulation than in the current or future market. Other structural changes 
might include increased liquidity and returns distributions beginning to closely resemble 
Gaussian white noise (i.e. reduced autoregression). I reconcile the simulation’s 
vulnerability to bias from structural changes in the market by positing that the effects of 
survivor and business cycle bias are likely much larger and more detrimental to my 
specific analysis than the effects of structural biases.  
The decision to include data prior to 1962 where available is less clear. I feel that 
this decision will not affect my results because the number of companies affected is likely 
small compared to the size of the sample population. Additionally, this does not create 
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any obvious bias. Time and computational constraints prevent me from performing the 
simulation a second time on a data set which does not include any data prior to 1962. 
 The return on the S&P 500 is a simple and ubiquitous proxy for the market return. 
This is a useful benchmark because it represents equity returns given full diversification. 
Since lack of diversification is one of the main disadvantages to ESPP participation, such 
a benchmark will help isolate this effect.  
 The risk free rate for a given month-long period is estimated by the Fama risk free 
rate, a CRSP data set which utilizes appropriate historic t-bill rates. It is useful for 
simulating a baseline return to control for the effect of nominal interest rates on 
investment allocation decisions. 
 The resulting raw data for each company consists of a sequence of 3-tupples 
whose entries are monthly returns to company stock, the S&P 500, and a riskless 
investment.  
Simulation Description 
 The simulation generates stock return series for each company by randomly 
drawing (with replacement) a 3-tupple to represent each simulated month. The sample 
space for each step is in bijection with the entire sequence of monthly returns for the 
company. Drawing by 3-tupple instead of separately for each asset maintains the historic 
correlations between the three assets. This simulation procedure is, in part, derived from a 
similar procedure used by Brown, Liang, and Wiessbenner (2004)iii. 
This method implicitly assumes that future returns are distributed identically to 
past returns. While the veracity of such an assumption is doubtful, it seems no less 
reasonable than any other assumption regarding the predictive value of statistical 
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analysis. Non-stationarity, a virtual certainty over 40 years, would clearly undermine my 
conclusions since it would invalidate the means and variances of the simulated 
distributions. However, since I am more concerned with the relative properties of the 
distributions as opposed to their absolute predictive power, I believe that this method is 
reasonably valid.  
 The simulation simulates 60 months (5 years) of returns on the three assets. I 
chose this length of time because, on a long enough horizon, total returns to an ESPP 
investment resemble a standard investment in company stock. I wanted to avoid 
expending computational energy generating data less central to the goal of evaluating 
ESPP participation. I chose not to simulate a shorter period because I wanted to run the 
process long enough for the ESPP to “converge” to the standard company stock 
investment. To ensure that the sample space from which the simulation draws is large 
enough, I remove companies which do not have at least 60 months of data. While the 
exact cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, the reasoning is clear in the extreme: a company with 
only 2 months of data would certainly pollute my analysis by putting a tremendous 
amount of weight on two months of returns which would individually not represent the 
theoretical return distribution to a useful extent. On the other hand, I must be sure not to 
eliminate too many companies or even to introduce additional survivor bias. The final 
population list contains 6,315 companies to which I apply the simulation. 
 I designed the simulation to capture the most prevalent incarnations of the ESPP. 
To that end, I assume the following: an offer period of 6 months, a standard look-back 
feature, a 15% discount, qualified disposition after the 18 months from the start of the 
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offer period, contributions only made on the first day of the offer period. As noted above, 
these features would describe the plurality of ESPPs very accurately. 
 I have decided to only assume one contribution because I am mainly interested in 
optimal employee behavior with regard to any single ESPP offering. Additionally, I could 
have used the simulated return distributions to replicate returns from further contributions 
if I later deemed it necessary. Finally, I can perform the single investment simulations 
without assuming a specific monetary amount for wealth and contribution. Transcending 
such parameters contributes to the robustness of this analysis.  
Total return for each asset is merely the gross monthly return times the gross total 
return prior to that month. Dividend reinvestment is assumed. Throughout this analysis I 
focus on returns instead of absolute dollar amounts and prices because all of the 
information I use and all of the processes I simulate are much more efficiently 
represented by and executed in terms of returns. Additionally, focusing on returns allows 
me to avoid having to assume an initial investment amount, thereby making the analysis 
more robust (as previously noted).  
 I ignore transaction costs because the shortest trading period I consider is six 
months and because no investment position I simulate involves more than three trades. 
Given current transaction costs for equity investments and the horizon that interests me, 
the effect of transaction costs should be negligible if asset allocation is not rebalanced. 
Moreover, transaction costs should effect all equity investments equally. At worst, 
spreads with the riskfree rate would be affected. 
 I ignore inflation because this analysis is comparative rather than absolute and 
inflation would affect all asset returns relatively equally. 
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Simulation Algorithm 
The following describes a single simulation run for a given company. Each 
simulation run generates a vector containing after-tax total returns for various assets and 
holding period lengths. 
At the contribution date, investors begin with a gross return of 100% on their 
initial investment. ESPP investors immediately receive a return equal to 1/(1-discount) to 
account for effect of the discount on their total return. Here I assume a 15% discount as is 
most common among ESPPs offered. 
Each month, a tupple containing monthly returns for the three assets is randomly 
drawn from the space of such tupples for the given company. For each asset, the gross 
monthly return is multiplied times the existing gross total return and then this step is 
repeated for as long as specified.  
To simulate the look-back feature for ESPP investors, after 6 months of returns 
have been generated, if the total ESPP return is less than the initial return from the 
discount, ESPP return is reset to the initial return from the discount. This is the total 
return equivalent to purchasing the company stock on the last day of the offer period 
given that the stock price fell over the course of the offer period.  
Total returns to investment in each of the three assets are reported after 6, 18, 36, 
and 60 months from the contribution. I chose these investment lengths because six 
months is the first date investors can liquidate their ESPP positions and still benefit from 
the discount and the look-back feature, the two aspects of ESPPs that are clearly 
advantageous regardless of the investor’s preferences or situation (i.e. refusing them 
would be turning down pure compensation). Eighteen months is the first date where the 
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ESPP position is considered a qualified disposition and therefore eligible for more 
favorable tax treatment. Sixty months is seemingly long enough to demonstrate the 
effects of holding an underdiversified position and thirty six months is a reasonable 
observation point between 18 and 60. Again, computational constraints prevent me from 
observing more data points. 
For each asset class, appropriate tax treatment is applied to the total returns for 
each of the four different simulated holding periods. To preserve simplicity without 
undermining the value of this analysis, I assume a marginal income tax rate of 28% and a 
capital gains tax rate of 20%. Since all analysis is comparative, the absolute tax rates 
matter less then the spread between the two. Given the likely income characteristics of 
ESPP investors and current tax policy, both the 8% spread and the absolute rates are 
realistic assumptions. As described above, gains on nonqualified ESPP positions are 
taxed at the income tax rate while gains on qualified ESPP positions beyond gains from 
the discount (1/(1-discount) – 1) are taxed at the capital gains rate. Investments in the 
market portfolio (S&P 500) are taxed at the capital gains rate to conform to reality. Since 
the risk free investment is intended to simulate return from a certificate of deposit or a 
money market account, it is accordingly taxed as income.  
I chose to ignore the tax benefits associated with capital gains losses. In part this 
is realistic because the types of individuals who would participate in ESPPs are unlikely 
to have gains needing to be offset since they probably do not much capital tied up in 
other investments. Additionally, given the goals and scope of this simulation, evaluating 
the implications of such benefits would have been ambiguous and distracting. 
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 After taxes are taken into consideration, the total returns for each of the four 
holding periods are complete. Next, a portfolio of three assets is generated according to a 
1/n allocation without rebalancing. The intent of this portfolio is to provide the 
hypothetical investor with an option which captures some of the benefits of ESPP 
participation with significantly less risk. Since n=3, one third of an investor’s 
hypothetical assets are allocated to each of the three assets. Because I ignore rebalancing, 
the investor earns the average of the three after-tax total returns for each period. The no 
rebalancing assumption is legitimate since previous studies overwhelmingly indicate that 
middle class investors rarely have the time, knowledge, or accommodative transaction 
costs to regularly rebalance their portfolios. While it is possible that such an investor 
might tweak his allocation over the course of five years, I choose to ignore this for 
simplicity and because I believe the non-rebalanced portfolio does not significantly 
depart from reality. The 1/n assumption is less valid but studies do suggest that such an 
allocation roughly approximates the behavior of many individual investors. 
Other Considerations 
 Because of the sheer size of the data set, I am unable to fully explore the optimal 
simulation length. I decide to perform the simulation 10,000 times for each of the 6,315 
companies in the data set because this number of trials severely tested the realms of 
feasibility given my computing constraints and yet still satisfied reasonable convergence 
requirements. Convergence is not a primary concern because the aggregate data I analyze 
is likely to converge much faster than the pure stock return distributions for a particular 
company.  
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Results and Analysis 
 Having generated 10,000 sets of total return data for each of the 6,315 companies, 
I must now measure and analyze aggregate characteristics of the distributions of returns.  
Percentiles 
 To acquire a coarse initial description of the return distributions, I compile a table 
containing the mean percentiles of the gross returns (Table 1). Each entry in the table is 
calculated by sorting the 10,000 simulated return entries for each asset and holding period 
of each of the 6,315 companies. The appropriate percentiles are then identified for each 
asset and holding period of each company. Finally, the percentiles for each asset and 
holding period are averaged over the 6,315 companies. In this way, I characterize the 
aggregate distributions of gross returns. A table entry is thus a proxy for the probability 
that the gross return on a given asset and holding period will be less than the entry.  
Table 1 also contains the means of the means and standard deviations for each 
asset and holding period. With these observations, I can analyze the skew and variability 
of the return distributions. Table 2 merely translates Table 1 into annualized net returns 
with monthly compounding.  
 Analysis of these two tables suggests that the data contain most of the properties I 
assumed the data would display. For instance, the median (50th percentile) annualized net 
return of the S&P 500 stays relatively constant over all the holding periods. This is as 
expected since, having controlled for business cycle risk, no evidence suggests that the 
average yearly return on the S&P 500 should change, regardless of the time horizon used. 
Also as expected, the standard deviation of gross returns of all three assets increases as 
holding period increases. This is consistent with intuition because the likelihood of 
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extreme total returns, such as the loss of the entire initial investment or a tenfold increase 
in the initial investment, increases dramatically over time. Moreover, note that 6 month 
returns to the ESPP are bounded from below in both tables. This is because of the 
imbedded look-back feature. According to the distribution, this feature is in-the-money 
between 25% and 50% of the time. Such a result it suggests that, over 6 months, any 
given stock is likely to increase in value between 25% and 50% of the time, reasonable 
aggregate behavior given generally accepted knowledge of equity returns. The median 
annualized net return for the ESPP investment decreases as holding period increases 
because a longer holding period decreases the influence of the lower bound provided by 
the look-back feature.  
 The most important general characteristic of the percentile tables is the fact that 
the mean returns on the ESPP and the portfolio investments are significantly higher than 
the mean returns on the comparable S&P 500 investments. On the other hand, the returns 
on the ESPP and the portfolio are significantly more variable than the returns on the 
benchmark. Thus, the data, at least roughly, illustrates the risk-return tradeoff of 
concentrating a significant portion of one’s investment in company stock as opposed to a 
diversified market portfolio.   
 The ESPP gross return distributions have extremely long and wide right tails. This 
is explained by two properties of the ESPP returns. The first is the influence of the look-
back feature. The second is the fact that loss potential is limited while gain potential is 
unlimited. While gross return cannot dip below 0, there is no upper limit. For instance, 
some of the simulated paths even resulted in ESPP returns of 6000% over a period of 60 
months.  
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 While these tables are useful for gleaning general properties of the return 
distributions, they do not provide sufficient detail to enable deeper comparisons. Such 
specific comparisons require more refined estimates for the aggregate return distributions 
and are necessary to inform optimal ESPP participation behavior. 
Densities 
 In order to obtain visual representations of the return distributions, I utilize 
nonparametric kernel density estimation. I use a Gaussian kernel function and estimate 
200 data points between 0 gross return and 12 gross return. I choose 12 as the upper 
bound because at least 95% of the area of all 12 return distributions is contained within 
the 0 to 12 interval. A benefit of using the same exact interval and data points for each of 
the density estimations is it enables easy aggregation and comparison. 
For each company, I use the density estimation procedure to estimate the 200 data 
points for each of the 12 return distributions. For each of the 12 return distributions, I 
then average the 200 data points over the 6315 companies. The result is an aggregate 
density for each asset and holding period pair. Next, I employ a spline procedure on the 
12 aggregate densities to obtain a piecewise analytical formula for each. Finally, I 
normalize each analytical formula by its 0 to 12 integral to ensure that the area 
underneath is identically 1. 
While this procedure requires some unorthodox assumptions, it seems a 
reasonable method for obtaining aggregate distributions of returns. Specifically, visual 
representations of these distributions provide a complete picture of the benefits and 
uncertainty associated with the various investment strategies considered. 
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Figures 1-4 plot the three gross return distributions for each of the four periods. 
Figure 1 shows the 6 month returns. As expected, the ESPP investment seems to provide 
the highest returns with a limited downside because of the look-back. The density 
distribution is not exactly vertical at gross return 1.12708 because the kernel density 
procedure divided the weight concentrated at that point between two nearby points. The 
S&P return seems to be distributed roughly lognormal, as expected. It also appears to 
have a smaller variance than the ESPP. Moreover, the portfolio return distribution 
exhibits characteristics of both pure return distributions.  
Figure 2 shows the 18 month returns. Already the downside risk eliminated by 
the look-back expresses itself. Clearly, the ESPP return distribution is much wider than 
the return distributions of the other two assets. While the ESPP has, by far, the highest 
upside, it also is the only asset that offers a realistic chance of 0 gross return (a total loss 
of investment). Note that, although it contains the extremely risky ESPP investment, the 
portfolio appears to have even less downside risk than the S&P. Both the portfolio and 
ESPP still appear to be skewed because of the residual benefits of the discount and look-
back. 
Figure 3 shows the 36 month returns. The S&P return is almost symmetric by this 
point while the ESPP return continues to widen dramatically. Intuition suggests that the 
ESPP return should resemble a Gaussian distribution truncated at zero to reflect 
investments that collect at zero, a point which that cannot go beyond or recover from. 
The kernel density procedure, however, results in flatter left tail. Again, the portfolio 
appears to have less downside risk than the S&P while offering a significantly greater 
upside. 
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Figure 4 shows the 60 month returns. The distortion caused by the smoothing 
procedure is even more pronounced in the density estimation of the 60 month gross 
returns. Again, based on intuition, the plot should resemble a normal distribution 
truncated at 0 with a very high density at 0 itself. Instead, it seems that much of the 
density within epsilon of 0 has been spread to other points, creating the illusion of a 
bimodal distribution. The S&P continues to converge to the normal distribution, as does 
the portfolio to some extent. The portfolio still maintains its long right tail, reflective of 
extreme values in the ESPP return distribution. 
While visual approximations of return distribution densities are informative and 
interesting, distinguishing between the economic characteristics of the relevant 
investments requires the introduction of a utility framework and an assumption about 
preferences 
CRRA Utility and Scenario Comparisons 
 In order to inform optimal behavior, I must first assume preferences under which 
employees can maximize utility. I choose to limit my focus to the Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion preference structure. 
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This CRRA utility function exhibits the unique property that the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion reflections the risk aversion of the employee. For instance, when c=0, U is 
linear so the employee is risk-neutral. As c increases, the employee becomes increasingly 
risk averse. As c approaches 1, U converges to log utility. 
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 Because of this property, rather than erroneously comparing absolute utility 
levels, I instead compare return distributions by solving for the coefficient which equates 
the expected utilities that result from each investment strategy. Thus, for a given pair of 
return distributions, if the c which equates expected utilities is greater than the level of 
risk aversion for a given employee, the riskier strategy is preferred. This is because the 
employee would have to be more risk averse than he already is to prefer the less risky 
strategy with its inferior expected return to the riskier strategy with its superior expected 
return.  
 Since the spline procedure produces unwieldy piecewise analytical functions, I 
cannot apply the CRRA analysis directly to the generated density estimates. Instead, I use 
the generated densities to create inverse cumulative distribution functions and these to 
randomly generate 100 points which represent each distribution. Next, for each 
distribution, I assume an initial investment and other wealth at the end of the holding 
period to generate total wealth given each gross return. Note that the absolute levels of 
initial investment and other wealth are irrelevant. Only the relative size of initial 
investment and other wealth matter. For instance, regardless of the dollar amounts 
assumed, the same c results from the initial investment, other wealth pairs of ($3,$10) 
and ($3000, $100,000). This allows me to generalize my findings to the relationship 
between initial investment and other wealth.  
 Finally, since this procedure only allows for binary comparisons, I must decide 
which investment strategy pairs to use. Since I am primarily interested in discovering 
optimal holding period length, I compare investment strategies of equal total holding 
period but whose ESPP exposure increases according to the time increments I simulated.  
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I begin with a 60 month investment in one of the two benchmarks. I then compare 
this to a 60 month strategy consisting of the first 6 months in the ESPP and the remaining 
54 months in the benchmark. Then I compare the 6 month ESPP strategy to a similar 
strategy with the first 18 months in the ESPP followed by 42 months in the benchmark. 
This continues until I compare a 36 month investment in the ESPP to a 60 month 
investment in the ESPP. I assume a constant total holding period because comparing 
returns over unequal periods would bias results due to the time value of money and 
positive expected returns for all investments involved. For instance, all else being equal, a 
36 month investment would yield a lower expected return than a 60 month investment. 
 I perform the aforementioned analysis on two scenarios. The scenarios correspond 
to the S&P benchmark and the portfolio benchmark. Subsequently, I analyze the 
differences between the two scenarios. In order to generate meaningful conclusions, I 
assume employees have a CRRA coefficient of 3. This assumption is arbitrary but 
reasonable. Obviously, applying this analysis to “real world” situations would require a 
more careful coefficient assumption. 
 Table 3 contains the results for Scenario 1, in which the S&P investment is the 
benchmark. I have assumed an initial investment of $3000 and consider different other 
wealth assumptions, between $0 and $300,000, in each column. Each row represents a 
pair of investment strategies being compared using the CRRA procedure. The strategy 
pairs increase in variance down the rows.  
Interestingly, the coefficients in each column decrease down the rows. This 
implies that the incremental differences between the less risky strategies are smaller than 
the incremental differences between the riskier strategies. Thus, the increased return 
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sacrificed by choosing the 6 month exposure over the 18 month exposure is greater than 
the return sacrificed in choosing the 36 month exposure over the 60 month exposure. This 
is particularly interesting because, in terms of number of months of exposure, the riskier 
comparison clearly forgoes more months of high return exposure than the low risk 
comparison.  
More predictably, the coefficients increase as other wealth increases. This means 
that individuals of greater wealth need to be increasingly risk averse to prefer the less 
risky strategies. Such behavior results because large reserves of other wealth essentially 
constitute diversification. Thus, as other wealth increases the marginal increase in the 
variability of total 60 month wealth due to ESPP investment decreases. 
The first row of Table 3 compares the 6 month ESPP followed by 54 month S&P 
strategy to the 60 month S&P strategy. For all wealth assumptions, the CRRA equating 
these two returns is large (and most likely does not exist). This is because the 6 month 
ESPP strategy offers less downside risk than the S&P strategy, because of the look-back, 
and a much higher expected return, due to the discount and the fact that single equities 
yield higher expected returns than the market portfolio. The next row compares the 18 
month ESPP strategy to the 6 month ESPP strategy. While investors with $0-$10,000 in 
other wealth after 60 months would clearly prefer the less risky 6 month exposure, those 
with more than $50,000 in other wealth would prefer the riskier 18 month exposure. The 
third row compares the 18 month ESPP exposure to the 36 month exposure. Here again, 
those with less than $10,000 in other wealth prefer the less risky, 18 month, strategy 
while those with more than $50,000 in other wealth prefer the riskier, 36 month, strategy. 
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The final row compares the 36 month exposure to a full 60 month exposure. In this case, 
those with less than $50,000 in other wealth prefer the less risky 36 month strategy.  
Thus, given my assumption of c=3, I can roughly conclude that those who expect 
their other wealth, after 60 month, to be less than 4 times their initial investment should 
only invest in the ESPP for 6 months and then move their money to the more diversified 
market portfolio. Similarly, those who expect their other wealth to be less than 17 times 
their initial investment should not invest in the ESPP for more than 36 months. Those 
who expect their other wealth to exceed 30 times their initial investment should invest in 
the ESPP for at least 60 months if not longer.  
Table 4 contains the results for Scenario 2, where the portfolio is the benchmark 
instead of the S&P. Other than the benchmark variation, the structure and assumptions of 
Table 4 are exactly the same as those of Table 3. As in the first scenario, the coefficients 
decrease down the rows. Also, the coefficients increase as other wealth increases. 
The optimal behavior implied the c=3 assumption is similar. Those who expect 
their other wealth to be roughly 10 times or less the amount of their initial investment 
should only invest in the ESPP for the minimum 6 months. Those who expect their other 
wealth to be roughly 60 times or less the amount of their initial investment should not 
invest in the ESPP for more than 36 months. Those who expect to have even higher other 
wealth can probably invest in the ESPP for longer, if not indefinitely, and still maximize 
expected utility.   
 
Conclusion  
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 This paper described a simulation procedure designed to uncover optimal 
employee behavior given the choice of participating in an Employee Stock Purchase 
Plan. An ESPP is a savings vehicle which allows employees to invest in company stock 
with numerous privileges including a discount, a look-back feature, and advantageous tax 
treatment. The simulation used empirical returns on company stock and other assets as a 
sample space from which it generated simulated returns to the ESPP and other assets. I 
used these simulated returns to estimate aggregate return distributions. Lastly, I compared 
these return distributions given employee preferences so I could posit optimal employee 
behavior. 
I demonstrated through this simulation that, given reasonable assumptions, ESPP 
participation maximizes expected utility. Individuals who decline to participate at all 
effectively refuse compensation. However, individual employee risk-preferences and 
overall wealth should govern the holding period of the ESPP. This simulation suggests 
that long-term participation in an ESPP is often sub-optimal for employees because it 
severely undermines portfolio diversity. This is especially important because managerial 
concerns often lead employers to encourage long-term investment in company stock 
through ESPPs and other company stock ownership programs. In light of this study, 
perhaps employers should find alternative ways of aligning incentives. 
As noted above, the methodology employed herein has several limitations. I did 
not perform sensitivity analysis on my tax rate assumptions. I did not test the implications 
of my data choices (i.e. the decision to exclude stocks with less than five years of returns 
or the decision to include all 40 years of available data instead of perhaps only 20 or 30 
years of data). Finally, I did not perform this simulation in a lifecycle framework and thus 
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could not model the interaction between company stock returns and labor income. Future 
analyses could examine these unanswered questions. 
Appendix 1: Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Distribution of Total Gross Returns 
  
ESPP 
6 Month 
ESPP 
18 Month 
ESPP 
36 Month
ESPP 
60 Month
S&P 
6 Month 
S&P 
18 Month
S&P 
36 Month 
S&P 
60 Month
Portfolio
6 Month 
Portfolio
18 Month
Portfolio
36 Month
Portfolio
60 Month
1% 1.1271  0.4611 0.3373         0.2911 0.8043 0.7340 0.6962 0.6835 0.9843 0.7539 0.7237 0.7383
5% 1.1271            0.6214 0.4956 0.4561 0.8749 0.8325 0.8210 0.8375 1.0078 0.8402 0.8181 0.8448
10% 1.1271            0.7323 0.6138 0.5862 0.9113 0.8874 0.8947 0.9332 1.0200 0.8955 0.8821 0.9201
25% 1.1273            0.9590 0.8874 0.9166 0.9703 0.9842 1.0316 1.1198 1.0398 1.0033 1.0190 1.0925
50% 1.1602            1.2911 1.3790 1.6032 1.0354 1.1007 1.2080 1.3744 1.0725 1.1528 1.2417 1.4062
75% 1.3612            1.8104 2.2927 3.1203 1.1019 1.2292 1.4155 1.6915 1.1616 1.3687 1.6154 2.0178
90% 1.6601            2.6145 3.9820 6.5159 1.1644 1.3576 1.6342 2.0435 1.2821 1.6796 2.2516 3.2682
95% 1.9084            3.3743 5.8474 10.9108 1.2035 1.4414 1.7822 2.2902 1.3779 1.9608 2.9231 4.8175
99% 2.5948            5.9224 13.7340 34.6889 1.2819 1.6150 2.1004 2.8406 1.6329 2.8682 5.6597 12.9391
Means 1.3058            1.5758 2.1873 3.8975 1.0369 1.1142 1.2428 1.4447 1.1215 1.2522 1.5228 2.1953
Std. Devs 0.3390            1.3367 5.3161 26.9187 0.1002 0.1867 0.2979 0.4566 0.1419 0.5027 1.8587 9.0985
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Annualized Net Returns 
  
ESPP 
6 Month 
ESPP 
18 Month 
ESPP 
36 Month
ESPP 
60 Month
S&P 
6 Month 
S&P 
18 Month
S&P 
36 Month 
S&P 
60 Month
Portfolio
6 Month 
Portfolio
18 Month
Portfolio
36 Month
Portfolio
60 Month
1% 0.2703      -0.4032 -0.3039 -0.2187 -0.3530 -0.1863 -0.1137 -0.073 -0.031 -0.172 -0.102 -0.059
5% 0.2703            -0.2718 -0.2086 -0.1453 -0.2346 -0.1150 -0.0636 -0.035 0.016 -0.110 -0.065 -0.033
10% 0.2703            -0.1876 -0.1502 -0.1013 -0.1696 -0.0765 -0.0364 -0.014 0.040 -0.071 -0.041 -0.017
25% 0.2707            -0.0275 -0.0390 -0.0173 -0.0586 -0.0106 0.0104 0.0229 0.0811 0.0022 0.0063 0.0178
50% 0.3461            0.1857 0.1131 0.0990 0.0720 0.0660 0.0650 0.0657 0.1503 0.0994 0.0748 0.0706
75% 0.8530            0.4854 0.3186 0.2556 0.2142 0.1475 0.1228 0.1108 0.3494 0.2328 0.1734 0.1507
90% 1.7559            0.8978 0.5850 0.4548 0.3558 0.2261 0.1779 0.1536 0.6438 0.4130 0.3107 0.2672
95% 2.6420            1.2497 0.8016 0.6128 0.4484 0.2760 0.2124 0.1802 0.8986 0.5666 0.4298 0.3695
99% 5.7330            2.2734 1.3948 1.0325 0.6433 0.3765 0.2807 0.2322 1.6663 1.0187 0.7821 0.6687
Means 0.7052            0.3542 0.2981 0.3127 0.0751 0.0747 0.0751 0.0764 0.2578 0.1618 0.1505 0.1703
Figure 1. Distribution of 6 month total gross returns 
 
Legend 
Solid = ESPP 
Grey = S&P 500 
Dashed = Portfolio
Figure 2. Distribution of 18 month total gross returns  
 
Legend 
Solid = ESPP 
Grey = S&P 500 
Dashed = Portfolio 
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Figure 3. Distribution of 36 month total gross returns  
 
Legend 
Solid = ESPP 
Grey = S&P 500 
Dashed = Portfolio 
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Figure 4. Distribution of 60 month total gross returns  
 
Legend 
Solid = ESPP 
Grey = S&P 500 
Dashed = Portfolio 
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Table 3. Scenario 1 CRRA Analysis 
CRRA Coefficients, Initial Investment = $3,000 
Strategy Comparison Other Wealth at 60 months 
Risk-Neutral Risk-Averse $0 $10,000 $50,000 $100,000 $300,000
ESPP 0-6 -> 
S&P 7-60 S&P 0-60 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
ESPP 0-18 -> 
S&P 19-60 
ESPP 0-6 -> 
S&P 7-60 0.797 2.462 8.693 16.438 47.387 
ESPP 0-36 -> 
S&P 37-60 
ESPP 0-18 -> 
S&P 19-60 0.614 1.967 6.783 12.741 36.539 
ESPP 0-60 ESPP 0-36 -> S&P 37-60 0.261 0.776 2.516 4.652 13.167 
 
Table 4. Scenario 2 CRRA Analysis 
CRRA Coefficients, Initial Investment = $3,000 
Strategy Comparison Other Wealth at 60 months 
Risk-Neutral Risk-Averse $0 $10,000 $50,000 $100,000 $300,000
ESPP 0-6 -> 
Portfolio 7-60 Portfolio 0-60 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 
ESPP 0-18 -> 
Portfolio 19-60 
ESPP 0-6 -> 
Portfolio 7-60 0.614 1.987 7.081 13.405 38.674 
ESPP 0-36 -> 
Portfolio 37-60 
ESPP 0-18 -> 
Portfolio 19-60 0.469 1.500 5.140 9.637 27.591 
ESPP 0-60 ESPP 0-36 -> Portfolio 37-60 0.160 0.462 1.484 2.737 7.733 
 
                                                 
i Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code 
ii (1) The employee must hold the stock for at least one year after purchase date, and (2) two years after the 
beginning of the offering period 
iii Brown, Jeffrey, Nellie Liang, and Scott Weisbenner, 2004, 401(k) Matching Contributions in Company 
Stock: Costs and Benefits for Firms and Workers,  NBER Working Paper 10419, April 
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